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THE CASE  AGAINST TRYING  TO STABILIZE  THE DOLLAR 
ABSTRACT 
Better  domestic  economic  policies  in  the 15 years  since the collapse 
of the Bretton  Woods system  would  have prevented  the extreme fluctuations 
of the dollar's  exchange  value  during  those  years.  The pursuit  of policies 
here and abroad that are appropriate  for dbmestic  growth  in the future 
should  reduce  the likelihood  of such substantial  exchange  rate swings  in 
the years ahead.  But elevating  exchange  rate stability  to a separate 
goal of economic  policy  could  have serious  adverse  consequences.  Trying 
to achieve that goal would mesn  diverting  monetary  and fiscal  policies  from 
their  customary  roles  and thereby,  risking  excessive  inflation  and unemploy- 
ment and inadequate  cspital  formation.  Succeeding  in the efforts  to achieve 
dollar  stability  would  mean harmful  distortions  in the balance of trade  and 
in the international  flow of  capital. 
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It is easy to understand why dollar stability has widespread 
political  appeal.  To businessmen, a fluctuating dollar means  an 
uncertain  competitive environment.  Relatively  small exchange 
rate fluctuations can eliminate previously profitable markets at 
home and abroad.  To consumers, a declining dollar can mean 
inflation and a lower standard of living.  And looking beyond 
economic self—interest, there is an atavistic nationalism that 
confuses  the dollar and the flag,  incorrectly regarding a strong 
dollar as a measure of national virtue and a declining  dollar as 
an indication of national weakness. 
Despite the popular support for the notion of a stable 
dollar, the analysis summarized in this short paper implies that 
a stable dollar, if it could be achieved, would prevent desirable 
adjustments and induce unwarranted ones.  The process of trying 
to stabilize  the dollar would require diverting monetary  and 
fiscal policies  from their customary goals and thereby create 
more inflation, more  unemployment, or an inferior rate  of capital 
formation than would  otherwise be possible. 
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There is, of course, nothing wrong with dollar stability if 
it happens to come about as a by—product of otherwise appropriate 
economic policies. That is not the issue that economists have in 
mind when they argue against trying to stabilize the dollar. The 
real issue is whether a  stable exchange value of the dollar 
should be a separate target of economic policy and, to the extent 
necessary, other policy goals should be sacrificed in order to 
achieve dollar stability. 
The appropriate exchange rate policy depends on the country 
and its economic circumstances.  A  small country within Europe 
that tiades a major share of its GNP with its neighbors may find 
it appropriate to fix its exchange rate relative to its major 
trading partners even though that requires sacrificing the 
independence of its monetary policy and accepting German economic 
hegemony.  Alternatively, even without important trade links, a 
country may choose to tie its currency to that of a low inflation 
country in order to achieve a monetary discipline and credibility 
that would not otherwise be possible.  In considering the 
appropriate policy  toward the dollar, it is important to 
recognize that U.S. trade is only 10 to 15 percent of GNP, that 
we can control our inflation rate through our own domestic 
monetary policy without an exchange rate anchor, and that the 
United States will not permit our monetary policy to be made in 
Frankfurt or Tokyo. 
One final word of introduction is appropriate. Economists 
who oppose pursuing policies to stabilize the dollar are sometimes accused of favoring inflation or other destabilizing 
domestic policies. It is easy to understand the source of this 
misunderstanding. The major swings of the dollar during the 15 
years since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system can be 
traced primarily  to the pursuit and subsequent corrections of 
inappropriate monetary and budget policies: the inflation of the 
1970s followed by the anti-inflationary monetary policy at the 
beginning of the 1980s; the surge in actual and projected budget 
deficits in the early  1980s followed by a gradual decline in 
actual and projected budget deficits after 1985 (see Feldstein, 
l988a). But the case against making dollar stability a separate 
goal of national economic policy should not be confused with 
condoning bad economic  policies.  Am economist can be a firm 
advocate of sound domestic policies while still rejecting the 
notion of dollar stability as a separate goal of economic policy. 
I.  Capital Markets, Goods Markets and Exchange Rates 
Before looking at the consequences of trying to stabilize 
the dollar by explicit policy manipulation, consider how exchange 
rates naturally vary  over time in response to supply and demand 
conditions in financial markets and in the international markets 
for goods and services. 
Consider  first the role of international capital markets. 
At any time there  exist in each country desired levels of saving 
and investment corresponding to prevailing interest rates.  If 
there were no opportunity to invest or borrow  abroad, each 4 
country's domestic  interest rate would adjust to bring saving and 
investment into balance.  With completely integrated world 
capital markets,  there would  be a single world real interest rate 
that balanced world—wide saving and investment while the 
individual domestic  saving and investment rates would in general 
be unequal.  In practice, capital markets are less than perfectly 
integrated and real interest rates differ anong countries. It 
nevertheless remains true that the saving rate in each country 
will not  in general be equal to the desired level of investment 
at the interest rate prevailing in that country.  If the desired 
level of domestic  saving exceeds domestic investment, there will 
be a capital outflow; if desired saving is less than desired 
investment, capital will flow into the country.1 
Since the capital flow is by definition equal to the current 
account balance which in turn is equal to the sum of the trade 
balance plus net international investment income, changing the 
capital flow in or out of the country requires  a change  in the 
trade balance.  And since the trade balance is a function of the 
exchange rate, the only way in which a sustained change in the 
capital flow can be brought about is by a  change in the exchange 
rate. 
Of course, conditions in the markets for goods and services 
also affect the exchange rate.  Any shift in the supply or demand 
for exports or imports  (at given exchange rates) will alter the 
exchange rate.  For example, if American consumers  increase their 
demand for foreign products at the existing dollar  exchange rate 5 
(because of a shift in tastes or an improvement in the relative 
quality of foreign products or a reduction in their foreign 
currency prices), the value of the dollar will  fall in order to 
maintain the initial level of the trade surplus or deficit and 
therefore  the initial level of the international capital flow. 
Thus shifts in forces that influence the demand and supply of 
goods and services alter the exchange rate in a way that is 
directly linked to the equilibrium capital  flow. 
Since exchange rate changes play such a central role in 
balancing the supply and demand in capital markets and in the 
markets for goods and services, how can anyone believe that 
exchange rates could remain constant? The textbook answer is that 
exchange rate changes are not needed to achieve a capital flow 
between two countries  if the products of the two countries are 
"perfect substitutes"  (in the sense that the cross—price 
elasticity of demand is infinite).  For example,  an increased 
desire to invest in one country would put Upward pressure oon its 
local prices, thereby inducing an increase in net imports 
sufficient to maintain  the initial level of demand.  This 
increase in imports automatically entails a capital inflow equal 
to the desired increase in investment. 
This "purchasing power parity" theory of fixed exchange 
rates is good textbook economics but only holds if the traded 
goods are perfect substitutes.  Experience shows repeatedly that 
the demand elasticities of similar products produced in different 
countries are far from infinite even over rather long periods of 6 
time.  As the experience of the l980s confirms,  imports end 
exports are slow to respond to changes in relative prices and 
therefore large departures of exchange rates from purchasing 
power parity are required to achieve significant shifts in trade 
balances, current account balances and capital flows. 
With  all of this as background, I can now consider the 
effects of trying to stabilize the dollar.  I will begin by 
examining the effects of a stable dollar, if it could somehow be 
achieved, on trade and capital flows.  I will then turn to the 
effects of trying to stabilize the exchange rate. 
II.  Adverse Effects of Artificial Dollar Stability 
Although shifts in saving and investment and in the supply 
and demand for internationally traded products night just happen 
to keep the dollar stable, such a singular coincidence can be 
ruled out as extremely unlikely.  In general, the dollar will 
have  to shift to achieve or maintain the desired net 
international capital flow described in the previous section. 
It is important in this context to distinguish real and 
nominal exchange rates.  Changes in nominal exchange rates are 
simply the changes in exchange rates quoted in the market, while 
changes in real exchange rates are those changes adjusted  for 
differences in inflation rates between the home and foreign 
countries.  Although  it is of course the real exchange rates that 
influence patterns  of trade and therefore the associated capital 
flows, popular  discussions and official pronouncements  do not 7 
make the distinction and therefore  implicitly discuss the 
stabilization  of nominal exchange rates.  (See Feldstein, l988b) 
Whenever  domestic inflation rates differ among countries the 
nominal exchange rates must change just to maintain the initial 
real exchange rates.  The prices of tradable products in the 
United States are currently increasing at about six percent a 
year  while the corresponding price  index in Japan is not 
increasing at all.  Maintaining the real yen—dollar exchange rate 
therefore  requires the nominal dollar—yen exchange rate to 
decline at a six percent annual rate.  Failure of the nominal 
dollar exchange  rate to decline in this way would, all other 
things equal, lead to an increasing U.S. trade deficit and a more 
rapid accumulation of debt to the rest of the world. 
Shifts in the nominal exchange rate that maintain a constant 
real exchange  rate may provide nothing more than a first 
approximation  to the required shift in the dollar's value.  For 
example, the sharp increase in the world oil supply in 1988 that 
caused a fall in the dollar price of oil during the past  year  was 
of greatest  help to those countries that are most dependent on 
imported oil.  Thus Japan, which imports all of its oil and for 
which oil imports are a large part of total imports, was 
particularly benefited.  The yen therefore had to rise relative 
to the dollar to prevent an increase in the Japanese trade 
surplus and a resulting unwanted  additional capital outflow from 
Japan. 
In addition  to the.  shifts of the exchange rate that are 8 
needed to balance differences in inflation rates and to offset 
shifts in supply and demand in world product markets,  the dollar 
has to shift to permit changes in desired levels of domestic 
saving and investment to be financed efficiently.  The most 
obvious example of this in the 1980s was the dramatic decline  in 
the U.S. saving rate caused by the surge in the budget deficit. 
Without an increased net capital inflow from the rest of the 
world, the U.S. net investment in plant and equipment, housing 
and inventories would have had to decline by approximately  one 
third.  In fact, the higher real U.S. interest rates attracted 
capital from abroad, inducing a rise in the real value of the 
dollar that caused an increased trade deficit that permitted the 
increased net capital inflow,  Without the capital inflow, the 
decline of U.S. saving would have caused a substantial 
misallocation  of worldwide  investment with the productivity of 
capital significantly higher in the U.S. than  abroad. Although 
the associated trade deficit had painful effects on some sectors 
of the American economy,  the overall U.S. unemployment  rate 
declined  and total GNP rose throughout the period of the 
increasing trade deficit. 
III.  Dangers of Trying to Stabilize the Dollar 
Trying to stabilize the dollar requires diverting monetary 
and fiscal policies from their traditional roles.  The result of 
such policy distortion can be a substantial sacrifice of the 
traditional goals of price stability, high employment and an 9 
appropriate level of national capital accumulation. 
Although currency market intervention is the most obvious 
tool of exchange rate manipulation,  it is also the least 
effective.  Experience continues to confirm that "sterilized 
intervention"  (i.e.,  the buying and selling of foreign currencies 
with offsetting changes in government debt to keep the total 
money supply unchanged) has little or no effect on exchange  rates 
(Obstfeld, 1988)  and that any such effect is likely to last for 
only a few days or at most a few weeks.  Some research suggests 
that even the modest impact of sterilized intervention exists 
only because financial markets interpret exchange market 
intervention as a "signal" that the government is prepared to 
shift monetary or fiscal policy to achieve the desired currency 
shift. 
In contrast to the ineffectiveness of exchange market 
intervention, changes in monetary policy can alter nominal 
exchange rates in the long run and real exchange rates in the 
nearer term.  Consider first the long term effects of monetary 
policy on nominal exchange rates.  An increase in the U.S. money 
supply eventually causes a corresponding rise in the U.S. price 
level.  If the U.S. price level rises, a stable real exchange 
rate requires a proportionate  fall of the nominal value of the 
dollar. This mechanism shows also how an expansionary monetary 
policy that raises the U.S. domestic price level can stabilize 
the nominal exchange rate when  the real value of the dollar is 10 
rising. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the effect of an 
expansionary monetary policy on the real exchange rate is only 
transitory.  An expansionary monetary policy can temporarily 
lower the real interest rate, causing the value of the dollar to 
decline.  Since the prices of goods and services increase only 
with a lag, the initial nominal decline of the dollar is 
temporarily  a real decline as well.  Over time, however, the rise 
in domestic prices matches the fall in the dollar.  There is a 
nominal dollar  decline but no change in the real value of the 
dollar.  In the long run, a shift in  monetary policy can have 
only a monetary or nominal effect and cannot alter real values. 
The experience in 1983 and 1984 illustrates the consequences 
of trying to use monetary policy to stabilize the nominal value 
of the dollar when its real value is being increased by 
fundamental real factors. At that time, increases in the current 
and projected budget deficits were raising the dollar's real 
value. The rising dollar induced substantial pressure on the U.S. 
government from foreign as well as domestic sources to take steps 
to reverse the dollar's sharp rise. Although a contractionary 
fiscal policy was widely advocated on the basis of domestic 
policy consideration at the time and would also have reduced the 
dollar's value, no fiscal action was taken.  If the pressure had 
succeeded in inducing the U.S. administration to stabilize the 
dollar, the responsibility would have fallen to the Federal 
Reserve.  An expansion of the money  supply would have produced a 11 
temporary  reduction in the real exchange rate and a sustained 
reduction  of the nominal exchange rate.  The important point is 
that after a temporary period the real exchange rate that 
influences trade would have been unaffected while the progress  of 
the early l9BOs in reducing inflation would have been reversed. 
The futility and the danger of using monetary policy to 
stabilize  the dollar is not just hypothetical.  In the spring of 
1987 the Federal Reserve began a policy of restricting the money 
supply and raising interest rates in order to support the value 
of the dollar.  The two percentage point rise in interest rates 
was one of the factors that precipitated the October stock market 
crash.  Had the Fed not then explicitly abandoned the goal of 
supporting the dollar and allowed interest rates to decline, the 
luuerican  economy might well have slid into recession in 1988. 
Although  neither exchange market intervention nor monetary 
policy can have a sustained effect on the real value of the 
dollar, budget and tax policies could in principle be used to 
stabilize the real value of the dollar over a sustained period of 
time.  As the experience in the early l980s demonstrated,  fiscal 
policies  that reduce national saving raise real interest rates, 
thereby increasing the attractiveness of dollar securities and 
causing the dollar to rise.  The opposite is true when fiscal 
policies  increase the national saving rate. 
But it is difficult to imagine circumstances  in which the 
gain from using fiscal policy to stabilize the dollar would 
outweigh the losses from an otherwise inappropriate fiscal 12 
policy.  At the present time, for example, the continued decline 
of the dollar could be delayed by fiscal actions that increase 
the real interest rate on dollar securities.  But there are no 
economists who advocate an increase in the budget deficit or a 
tax change that penalizes private saving in order to stabilize 
the dollar. 
One final word about the harmful effects of trying to 
stabilize the dollar.  Although economists focus on real exchange 
rates, official pronouncements and policy decisions within the 
group of 0—7 finance ministers are always in tens  of nominal 
exchange rates.  In a world in which nominal interest rates 
differ because of differences in inflation rates, the promise of 
nominal exchange rate stability is itself destabilizing.  In 1988 
U.S. interest rates exceeded corresponding Japanese rates by 
about four percentage points, approximately the difference  in 
thflation rates,  Portfolio investors who believed the G-7 
assertions that the nominal dollar—yen exchange rate would 
nevertheless remain stable were induced to buy the higher 
yielding dollar securities.  The result was a dollar  increase of 
nearly 15 percent relative to the yen between January  and October 
despite the evidence that the U.S. trade deficit and the Japanese 
trade surplus would remain very large unless the dollar fell 
further.  When  the credibility of the G—7 forecast evaporated in 
November, the dollar fell back to its January level.  The 
counterproductive emphasis on nominal exchange rates does not 
reflect a lack of understanding on the part of the key 0-7 13 
finance ministers,  central bankers, and advisors  but appears to 
be dictated by the political  character of official efforts at 
exchange rate stabilization. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Better domestic  economic policies in the 15 years since the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system would have prevented the 
extreme fluctuations of the dollar's exchange value during those 
years. The pursuit of good policies here and abroad in the future 
should reduce the likelihood of such substantial exchange rate 
swings in the years ahead.  But elevating exchange rate stability 
to a separate goal of economic policy would have serious adverse 
consequences.  Trying to achieve that goal would  mean diverting 
monetary and  fiscal policies  from their customary roles and 
thereby risking excessive inflation and unemployment and 
inadequate capital formation.  And succeeding in the effort to 
achieve dollar stability would mean harmful distortions in the 
balance of trade and in the international flow of capital. 14 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The degree of capital market integration appears to be 
increasing over time but is still far from complete. See 
Feldstein and Bacchetta  (1988). 
2. The price indices used to convert nominal exchange rates to 
real exchange rates provide only a very imperfect measure of the 
changes in actual price competitiveness because of the 
impossibility of adequately reflecting changes in quality and the 
introduction of new products. These measurement problems  raise 
serious doubts about any attempt to calculate purchasing power 
parity exchange rates. 15 
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